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In Search of a Feasible EU-Mercosul 
Free Trade Agreement 
Renato G. Flôres Jr* 
CEPS Working Document No. 378/ February 2013 
Prologue: Rêver l’Impossible Rêve 
On  29  May  1992,  a  Joint  Institutional  Cooperation  Agreement  was  signed  between 
Mercosul’s Common Market Council and the European Commission. On 15 December 1995, 
an  Interregional  Framework  Cooperation  Agreement  (FA)  was  jointly  signed  by  the 
European Union and the four Mercosul countries. Faithful to the pompous, ambitious and 
seducing rhetoric of Brussels, the FA comprised a broad set of initiatives and commitments, 
including economic issues and, notably, trade. In June 1996, under the umbrella of the FA, 
the first of several meetings of a Joint Commission on Trade took place. After three years of 
preparatory  studies  and  discussions,  the  European  Commission  decided,  in  July  1998,  to 
negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with Mercosul (and Chile). Meetings and discussions 
started in the same year. 
As inevitably happens in FTA negotiations involving the integration of two regions – one 
more developed and sophisticated than the other, though in the latter case there was a big 
economy and somewhat diversified trader – the process was slow. On the Mercosul side, the 
great asymmetry represented by Brazil obliged a careful attitude by this country, in order to 
avoid hurting both the feelings and intentions of its smaller partners. On the European side, 
a developed bloc notoriously more protectionist than the US, the question of the common 
agricultural  policy  (CAP)  –  unacceptable  to  the  competitive,  agribusiness  commodities 
exporters of Mercosul – plagued many of the discussions.  
Even so, negotiations moved on.  
In the more external realm, Mercosul – at that time – still struggled to attain an institutional 
level minimally comparable to that of the EU. The lack of this, though not an impediment to 
negotiations,  was  often  raised  by  the  European  Commission  as  a  nuisance,  if  not  a  real 
hindrance to the process. The EU, forced by exogenous pressures and powerful allies, sped 
up an enlargement that gave way to administrative and governance difficulties, many still 
prevailing today, beyond bringing further unknowns to the issues on the table. 
From  the  European  Commission,  the  head  of  the  process  was  Pascal  Lamy,  then 
commissioner for DG Trade. Mr Lamy many times asserted that the enlargement had no 
influence at all on the process, a point not exactly confirmed by the analyses in Flôres and 
Perez-Liñan (2004). He strongly supported the EU position that systemic issues, like the CAP 
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– and consequently any pledge related to it, including liberalisation – should be left to the 
‘forum for systemic issues’, the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Mercosul tried to find acceptable liberalisation schedules that would consider a plethora of 
queries: from the specific aims of the Argentine producers of galletitas [biscuits] (many with 
considerable traces of transgenic soya – a nutritional sin for the sacred EU food regulations), 
to  the  fears  and  quarrels  between  the  European  carmakers  and  their  own  Mercosul-
established plants (the former opposing liberalisation for fear that, thanks to an unexpected 
exchange-rate misalignment, their home markets would be ‘flooded’ by the cheaper clones 
made  in  Mercosul).  At  the  same  time,  the  industrial  sectors  in  Brazil  and  Argentina 
experienced  pains  in  finding  a  common  liberalisation  stance  and,  more  difficult  yet,  one 
acceptable to the EU manufacturers. 
Even so, negotiations went on. 
It is the subjective feeling of this author that, at the end of Mr Lamy’s mandate in 2004, with 
a little luck the FTA could have been signed. Yet, trifling arguments and vacuous objections – 
some frankly ridiculous – led to a lost opportunity. Naming and shaming ensued, useless 
and pointless: both sides had perhaps the same degree of responsibility for the failure. 
In May 2005, the ‘enlargement of the ten’ took place, setting the number of EU member states 
at 25. 
As  usually  happens  after  such  anti-climaxes,  the  FTA  idea  hibernated  for  a  while,  with 
expectations being fixed on Geneva, where the Doha Round was still active. 
But then world changed surprisingly fast.  
An encompassing financial crisis, with deep roots and a wild unfolding, took hold of the 
developed world and nowadays poses serious problems to the subset of EU countries in the 
eurozone – problems whose solution perhaps does not exist within the present architecture 
of the zone.  
The WTO Doha Round also reached a climax, but optimists were defeated at Potsdam – an 
ironically gloomy place for fixing a positive, solar agreement. Since then, it has been trailing 
the usual path of moribund rounds: it will not die at all, but provided half a dozen ‘ifs’ take 
place, it will be concluded in a low key manner. 
The dynamics of several internal markets have changed accordingly.  
The entry of Asia as a global customer, particularly though not only China, has opened new 
opportunities for commodity exporters, Mercosul countries included. The CAP did change 
and continues to do so, owing to many constraints, demographic ones helping, but the point 
is that it became less relevant to Mercosul exporters.  
The  invasion  of  Asian  goods  in  the  developed  markets  has  contributed  to  altering 
perceptions on many sides. Trade alliances are progressively shifting; South–South trade, 
which used to be mocked as a silly diversion by a few emerging countries, is now taken 
seriously; and the big US and EU markets, though still big (if declining), are looked at with 
different  eyes.  Technology,  more  than  prospective  buyers,  is  what  the  emerging  horde 
wants. 
During all these tempi sconvolgenti, like a Pirandellian or Samuel Becket character, the EU–
Mercosul  FTA  would  irregularly  surface  to  quickly  fall  back  again  into  oblivion  a  few 
months  later.  As  expected,  the  rhetoric  of  the  authorities  involved  remains  impeccable: 
Brussels pursues its florilège of niceties and fatherly lectures on how to do things properly – 
i.e. just mirror its way – and announces that the coming agreement will be very ambitious. 
Mercosul  leaders  gather  their  best  possible  faccia  di  legno  and  second  their  European IN SEARCH OF A FEASIBLE EU-MERCOSUL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT | 3 
 
counterparts  in  singing  the  affirmative  ομιλία.  The  Sturm  und  Drang  of  the  whole  affair, 
apparent even to a fifth-rate Schiller, is deftly swept below the table. 
In  the  midst  of  the  present  euro-hurricane,  while  Mercosul  lives  temporarily  with  a 
suspended Paraguay and a newly received Venezuela, it is again trumpeted that the FTA 
will move on. Rêver l’impossible rêve, sang the great Jacques Brel... 
The  following  sections  outline  what  seems  feasible  nowadays  as  the  Mercosul–EU  FTA, 
taking into account the stage set in this prologue. Section 1 deals with trade in goods, 2 with 
services and 3 with other themes. Section 4 sketches some political economy considerations, 
most  of  them  working  against  the  negotiations.  Section  5  is  a  needed  pause,  inviting  a 
serious, definite positioning in this already half-rotten, half-ridiculous affair, while the last 
section outlines a constructive, more realistic path to be trodden. 
1.  The classical arena: Trade in goods 
In spite of the many years in which the EU–Mercosul FTA has been discussed, there are not 
many quantitative studies of the impact of such an agreement on the trade flows.  
Among  the  perhaps  half-dozen  existing  efforts,  Calfat  and  Flôres  (2006)  is  a  pervasive, 
partial-equilibrium  analysis  of  the  prospective  gains.  Although  the  base  years  for  the 
simulations are the couples 1997–98 and 2000–01, the study is still useful.  
On  the  Mercosul  side,  in  spite  of  the  significant  trade  deviation  to  China  and  southern 
partners in general, as the exercise is a partial equilibrium one, most of the effects are at least 
valuable as an upper bound for gains at the individual product level. On the EU side, the 
situation is more debatable, as its trade pattern might have changed in a more pronounced 
way.  The  overall  message,  however,  that  EU  gains  are  much  more  widespread,  distributing 
themselves  among  various  manufactured  goods,  while  Mercosul  will  reap  advantages  from  a  few 
number of commodity exports, still seems plausible today. 
Adherence to the above reasoning implies that, even now, a minimally acceptable agreement 
regarding  the  flow  of  goods  is  not  very  difficult.  It  suffices  that  the  EU  makes  a  (not 
necessarily) bold gesture of fully liberalising half a dozen agricultural goods, most in the 
broad  ‘meat’  category,  and  the  Mercosul  arrives  at  conceding  immediate  or  short-run 
liberalisation to a spectrum of about 50-100 manufactures, for the outcome to move quickly 
to the neighbourhood of a Pareto optimum. 
Is this feasible? This author thinks it is, provided two mechanisms are successfully at work: 
i)  the EU couples its nice words to its gestures and really ensures the liberalisation of the 
few commodities. The evolution – or optimistically, progressive dismantling – of the 
CAP and the present crisis might be intelligently used in favour of this argument; and 
ii)  Mercosul mainly selects recalcitrant Brazilian protectionists and quite a few sectors of 
Argentina’s vanishing manufacturing industry and manages to agree to an upfront 
liberalisation that would nevertheless still give room for protecting so-called ‘sensitive 
items’ with longer liberalisation periods. 
The above conditions are not easy, but are not insurmountable either, being fairly attainable. 
They also presuppose that both sides lower their expectations and work towards the possible, 
not the ideal agreement. 
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2.  Trade in services 
During the second phase of the Uruguay Round, the EU joined forces with key developing 
countries, notably Brazil and India, in trying to fashion a more conservative format for the 
inclusion of services in the (then) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (and soon after 
the WTO), contrary to the more aggressively free trade stance of the US. Ironically, during 
the  FTA  negotiations,  the  European  Commission  tried  to  enforce  a  much  broader  and 
encompassing liberalisation of services, not exactly congenial to the mood prevailing among 
Mercosul members. 
Brazil,  within  the  regional  market,  had  consistently  kept  a  fairly  conservative  position 
towards services trade, and small Uruguay had skilfully and successfully managed to keep 
its peculiar and not exactly open view on this matter, something that spilled over into the 
negotiations. 
Time,  however,  has  changed  this  state  of  affairs.  For  select  sectors,  like  telecoms,  the 
technology  and  investment  dynamics  have  significantly  altered  the  status  quo.  Most 
European  operators  –  such  as  Telefónica,  Telecom  Italia  and  Vodafone  –  are  present  in 
Mercosul,  and  the  local  regulatory  framework has  advanced  considerably.  Moreover,  for 
most  of  them,  these  are  the  markets  where  they  reap  the  biggest  profits  nowadays, 
compensating  many  times  for  losses  in  their  domestic  (European)  turfs.  Finally  yet 
importantly,  the presence  of  the  same  operators  on  both  sides  of  the Atlantic  has  raised 
awareness of the need for closer cooperation, in the regulatory frameworks as well as in their 
(somewhat tense) relations with value-added providers, many US-based.  
The pressing requirements for infrastructure upgrading and better logistics have also been 
slowly making Mercosul conscious that it actually (and desperately) needs the know-how of 
sophisticated  ancillary  services  for  the  functioning  of the manufactures  and  commodities 
production  networks,  if  not  for  the  whole  productive  system.  The  recent  arrival  of  the 
fragmentation  wave  in  South  America  will  also  eventually  contribute  to  a  more  open 
mentality as regards the need for such services.1 
In  a  less  positive  tone,  veiled  or  diplomatically  justified  protectionist  trends  have  been 
promoting the revival of state champions in key service sectors in Mercosul, telecoms being 
but one relevant example. But the euro crisis has probably also exacerbated protectionist 
views on the European side, in certain important sectors. The most notorious examples are in 
the financial and insurance domains where, contrary to its free trade rhetoric, the European 
Commission has been a fierce advocate of the conservative positions of individual member 
states. 
What is then possible within this context? 
Again,  the  approach  must  aim  at  the  feasible,  which  would  amount  to  liberalisation  in 
specific, workable areas and not an encompassing attempt at many sectors. Some aspects of 
telecoms might be on board, with a few other examples being industrial services and those 
related to energy generation and extraction, retail and distributive trade, and some parts of 
air and maritime transport.  
                                                   
1  Production  fragmentation,  usually  coupled  with  international  value-added  chains,  though  well 
known for decades in select manufacturing sectors like the car industry, gained momentum with the 
rise  of  China,  when  the  US,  Japan  and  later  South  Korea  strongly  displaced different  production 
stages to Chinese territory. The successful way with which China managed its climb up the value-
added chains led to a sizeable spill-over of the phenomenon to South-East Asia, with the chains now, 
beyond the three original providers, heavily interwoven with Chinese firms themselves. See among 
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Professional services, especially those related to Mode IV (presence of natural persons) and, 
in a few instances, also to Mode III (right of establishment) of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, offer an interesting case in point. Moura (2003) draws attention to the fact 
that, in spite of its varied needs, the EU was adamant in opening a negotiating position on 
this area.  
The present situation, with unemployment rates at unimaginable levels in many member 
countries, is at first sight a strong motivation for the EU to close ab initio any prospects along 
this line. At the same time, Mercosul, particularly Brazil, faces shortages of qualified people, 
partially owing to its demographic evolution.2 Although this could be a bargaining asset for 
Mercosul,  in  case  the  EU  spreads  its  ambitions  across  too  many  areas,  an  innovative 
compromise could be struck here.  
3.  Other themes 
Another characteristic of FTA negotiations during the years following the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, was to include on the agenda for the agreement a series of issues, 
some still in direct line with WTO texts, like property rights and subsidy policies, while 
others were of a more debatable nature, like labour and environmental clauses or money 
laundering.  
In the present context, these inclusions should be kept to a bare minimum. Actually, only 
property  rights,  and  even  then  not  in  a  TRIPS-Plus  endeavour  but  rather  as  a  mutual 
commitment  to  joint  enforcement  against  specific  and  costly  violations,  seems  possible. 
Although  quite  reluctant  to  take  any  further  step  in  this  area,  Mercosul  countries  have 
moved  to  a  position  where  discussion,  at  least,  is  accepted.  EU  countries,  in  their  turn, 
should profit from this gap in a pragmatic way: rather than asking for progress in rules or 
further regulations, they should secure the full protection of their rights for those goods, 
brands or designs where they identify the greatest losses. 
A  new  point,  however,  owing  to  the  regulatory  frenzy  of  the  European  Commission, 
producing directives that end up creating serious trouble and costs for its trading partners, 
could be treated as part of this item. 
Directives like REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical 
Substances, published on 18 December 2006), which triggered an incredible amount of red 
tape and imposed unwontedly high costs to exporters of anything that contains chemical 
substances – from the substances themselves to goods, like furniture or toys, where painting, 
varnishing or the addition of any chemical compound took place – are actually a technical 
barrier to trade.  
A  mutual  agreement  on  trade  facilitation  measures,  in  which  not  only  the  European 
Commission  would  agree  to  help  its  partners  comply  with  its  myriad  of  excessive 
regulations, but also a common dialogue is established in order to minimise the effects of 
REACH-like  directives,  would  be  a  plus.  Of  course,  reciprocity  in  consultation  when 
elaborating rules affecting trade would be mandatory.  
4.  The political economy of the proposed talks 
The  negotiating  environment,  as  previously  noted,  could  perhaps  not  be  worse.  If  the 
European state of affairs does not need any qualification, in Mercosul one cannot say that 
conditions are auspicious. More than the ‘Paraguayan incident’, which will be streamlined in 
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one way or other, the situation in Argentina demands care and attention: the country is 
living through a most unfavourable period, with actually no mindset for a negotiation like 
the one at stake.3  
Moreover, in comparison with the classical locus of long trade negotiations, the WTO, the 
prospects are even worse. The Uruguay Round lasted 8 years, while the Doha Round has just 
completed 11 years of unfinished negotiations, although it is progressing and new ideas have 
arisen. The EU–Mercosul FTA debate has already reached 14 years of no progress at all, and 
more than 16 if we include the preparatory years when much effort was spent! How can this 
pursuit still be credible? 
Brazilian multinationals are looking at Singapore, Jakarta, Hanoi and even New Delhi and 
other bases to penetrate in the Asian market. Studies and projects are underway to connect 
them to global production chains in the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) 
region, plus Japan, South Korea and of course, China (ASEAN+3). The ASEAN+3 FTA, pre-
empted by many as impossible, will be a reality in maybe less than ten years. Irrespective of 
the fate of the more doubtful Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it will change the pattern of 
world trade.  
Mercosul  countries,  now  with  the  addition  of  the  important  Venezuelan  market  (a  key 
Amazon  country),  are  also  concerned  with  their  South  American  neighbourhood  where 
China has been slowly gaining market share. Developments are expected under the umbrella 
of  the  Union  of  South  American  Nations  (UNASUL)  –  beyond  the  very  successful 
cooperation  in  joint  defence  and  public  health  actions  –  not  only  in  infrastructure  and 
services but also in production complementarities. 
The  EU  and  eurozone  configuration  will  perforce  change,  at  least  in  regulatory  terms, 
entailing new dynamics in the common market and, very likely, in many services sectors. At 
present, not only reforms aiming at a common – or something resembling it – fiscal policy, 
and a really unified banking system for the eurozone, are stumbling along. Progress is not 
absent, but far from the minimally ideal levels. Moreover, financial markets for European 
securities are still volatile, if not shaky, bringing further uncertainty to a negotiating mood. 
Alongside the above matters, sooner or later, the eurozone will have to face the question of 
the euro exchange rate. The current levels are unsustainable, and this transition (and to what 
new level) is a huge unknown. The US, for its part, is abusing the quantitative easing (QE) 
device, causing macroeconomic trouble not just for strong allies in South America, such as 
Chile and Colombia,4 but for nearly all of the emerging countries, including Brazil and South 
Korea. This exacerbates a declining euro trajectory. 
This  author,  while  recognising  the  inevitable  relationship  between  exchange-rate  policies 
and  trade,  is  not  quite  in  favour  of  ideas  aired  by  friends  and  foes  alike,  on tying  such 
measures,  under  certain  circumstances,  to  WTO-like  trade  defence  mechanisms.5  That 
notwithstanding, it is an old truth that trade agreements need minimally stable currency 
markets, at least among the nations involved, and this is hard to foresee in the near future. 
                                                   
3 To this must be added the recent (official) query by Bolivia to become a full Mercosul member, and 
the slight likelihood of Ecuador following suit within a year or two. 
4  See  the  interesting  statement  by  Felipe  Larrain,  “Remember  the  effect  of  QE  on  the  emerging 
economies”  (Financial  Times,  5  February  2013),  Chile’s  minister  of  finance.  The  piece  is  doubly 
significant given that the country of its author is perhaps the most faithful follower of the US spirit in 
South America. 
5 I’m aware that this theme is going to be discussed as part of another sub-topic of the Project, and I’ve 
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Finally, the recently re-elected US President, Barack Obama, has signalled that two main 
trade agreements will rank high in his priorities. These are the TPP and the long-dreamt of 
bilateral  EU–US  transatlantic  trade  deal.  Despite  scepticism  about  the  former,  as  noted 
above,  the  official  launch  of  negotiations  for  the  transatlantic  deal  will  amount  to  a 
considerable diversion of the already feeble incentives for the other, southern Atlantic FTA.6  
Very ironically, at the time of writing, both the EU and the US announced this pursuit. All 
the  headaches  plaguing  the  EU  nowadays,  briefly  outlined  in  this  section,  also  act  as 
deterrents to these negotiations, and the size of the two partners is a double-edged sword, 
cutting knots as well as hurting deeply. But in spite of all the difficulties in this venture it 
will unavoidably reduce the tepid enthusiasm for the Mercosul deal.  
5.  Intermezzo: The gravissimo pace of the negotiations 
The  problems  outlined  in  the  previous  section,  and  the  modest  stances  favoured  in  the 
preceding ones, lead to the tough conclusion that at least for the next two to three years, the 
priority of this (already) zero-credibility FTA is, in plain English, close to zero.  
What is the way out? Is it possible to change the gravissimo pace to at least a larghetto, or 
better yet, andante? 
Two alternatives are offered here, the second having a nearly mandatory follow-up: 
i)  the first is to engage, as soon as possible, in a restricted agreement along the lines of 
sections 1-3, keeping in mind that the top priority is to sign something within a very 
sharp  deadline,  say  December  2014.  This  amounts  to  a  substantial  change  in  the 
ambitious and vapidly proud announcements of an encompassing FTA, and a deeply 
concerned endeavour for arriving at minimally (WTO) acceptable results; and 
ii)  the second starts by putting a full stop to the lingering rhetoric of the FTA. Close the 
book: no more cheap talk about a meeting that will turn the state of world affairs, no 
more Panglossian-smiling authorities saying that the FTA is alive and well, in the best 
of all possible trade-negotiating environments. Finito. More than precious time, über-
precious credibility has been lost! 
Once – and if – both sides have gathered sufficient courage to take this healthy, transparent 
decision, signalling a frank and realistic Weltanschauung, a simple, progressive strategy may 
be adopted. Its purpose is to strengthen trade ties and prepare the ground for a likely closer 
trade association that would start afresh, two to three years from now. The outline of such a 
route is in the next, concluding section. 
6.  Conclusion: (Re)Starting from the very beginning, a very good place to 
(re)start 
Mercosul displays weak governance and needs technology; the EU’s governance oftentimes 
sets those who interact with it al borde de un ataque de nervios and plenty of trouble, but still 
holds solid technological capital.  
Why not start with a comprehensive, honest and Pareto-improving agreement on technology 
transfer? Brazil has signed a model one with Canada, which has been bearing extremely 
interesting fruits; it can be a source of inspiration. The French are reasonably good in this 
area – the contract on nuclear submarines with the Brazilian Navy, including a progressive 
transfer of technology, makes another interesting source. The UK can also do this very well, 
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if motivated, while Germany is an old and solid partner and the Belgians and Dutch can, 
without much effort, come on board.  
The family of FAs always mentions and opens moves in this direction, though reasonably 
vapid. Moreover, we are not talking about education, the exchange of either students or 
professors;  the  focus  should  be  on  industrial,  business  applications  that  would  generate 
connections and more business, and put in closer contact plants, laboratories and SMEs on 
both sides.   
Such  an  approach,  if  seriously  undertaken,  would  take  one  or  two  years.  But  it  would 
produce  something  concrete  –  reasonably  independent  of  the  crises  on  both sides  of  the 
Atlantic – to be presented to decision-makers and to the business community, the ultimate 
engines of trade negotiations. 
Then we should move to regulations.  
Here, the European Commission, with the help of the European Parliament, should make a 
bold gesture and create a mechanism to give Mercosul a word in the making of directives 
and all kinds of rules.7 It does this already, though in an imperfect way and with oscillations 
in its commitment, with the US. Mercosul is a much less menacing competitor and, exactly 
because of this, it would be easier to craft a scheme for it. Mercosul would undoubtedly be 
proud to participate – even if indirectly and with strings attached – in such an effort. The 
effects until now of the present lack of dialogue, at least for Brazil, have been devastating to 
our trade relations. 
The methodology proposed by Messerlin (2013),8 of mutual recognition, could be a relevant 
stepping  stone  towards  deepening  mutual  confidence  and  establishing  a  positive 
environment for joint actions and a closer, transparent collaboration in this context.  
An  additional,  valuable  complement  would  be  a  wise  probing  of  existing  Mercosul 
legislation  that  would  either  open  specific  service  markets  to  EU  providers  or  globally 
facilitate  trade  in  services.  As  previously  noted,  the  telecommunications  sector,  where 
sizeable  gains  of  the  EU  operators  come  from  Mercosul,  is  a  significant  example.  In  air 
transport, Brazil signed the Open Skies agreement with the US – something deemed nearly 
impossible 20 years ago – beyond having countries like Qatar as partners in similar treaties. 
Although the one with the EU is still hostage to bureaucratic details, an encompassing EU–
Mercosul deal on open skies is not inconceivable. 
Moving from the above to a streamlining of cross-investment legislation in both regions is 
not a very bold step, and could open the way to creating incentives for more diversified and 
substantial investment flows, either greenfield or under the fragmentation logic. 
These initiatives may be pursued by specific, thematic groups, which are less demanding in 
human  resources,  time  and  complex  political  considerations.  The  targeted  sectors  or 
regulations should be directly addressed and bottlenecks or constraints clearly identified. 
Deadlines would be easier to set and higher-level coordination could be conducted at the 
trade organisms of both blocs. The initiatives would also serve as a preliminary display of 
seriousness and commitment. 
At the same time, Mercosul, and notably Brazil, should do long-overdue homework. The 
common external tariff must be thoroughly re-examined and a wise reformulation, keeping 
in mind the modern realities of world production and the new requirements of its members, 
should be undertaken.  
                                                   
7 See Flôres (2010b) on possible roles for the Parliament in this context. 
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Perhaps this is the most difficult task outlined in these pages, aggravated by the present 
protectionist sentiment in the bloc. It is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for (later) 
fixing the agreement, but beyond helping considerably in future negotiations, it is something 
that should be undertaken as a top priority by Mercosul itself independent of any existing or 
likely negotiation. 
If two or three of the above things are fixed, something like three years from now will have 
elapsed. That is enough time to see how far the euro streamlining went, to evaluate the mood 
about Doha and to settle the Mercosul quibbles. Then there might be incentives to open 
negotiations  for  a  very  well-defined  FTA:  a  classical,  somewhat  restricted  one,  with  the 
broad lines for achieving it being those set out above in sections 1-3. 
If this classical FTA is signed, and only then, this author believes credibility will have been 
restored to go for more ambitious settlements. 
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